{"id":2979,"date":"2026-08-03T10:25:24","date_gmt":"2026-08-03T09:25:24","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/blogs.bath.ac.uk\/iprblog\/?p=2979"},"modified":"2026-08-03T10:50:17","modified_gmt":"2026-08-03T09:50:17","slug":"interview-dr-sun-yixian-on-his-new-database-tracking-chinese-climate-leadership","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/blogs.bath.ac.uk\/iprblog\/2026\/08\/03\/interview-dr-sun-yixian-on-his-new-database-tracking-chinese-climate-leadership\/","title":{"rendered":"Interview: Professor Yixian Sun on his new database tracking Chinese climate \u2018leadership\u2019"},"content":{"rendered":"

Professor Yixian Sun<\/a>, a sustainability governance expert at the University of Bath, explains what his new database of China-led climate initiatives reveals about the country's evolving international role and whether this amounts to climate leadership.<\/em><\/p>\n

The number of global climate initiatives launched or run by China has been growing since 2009, a new study<\/a>\u00a0shows.<\/p>\n

But whether this will translate into China taking up the mantle of climate leadership remains an \u201copen question\u201d, says Professor Yixian Sun<\/a>, study co-author and professor of sustainability governance at the\u00a0University of Bath<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Yixian's team has compiled a database<\/a>\u00a0tracking all global environmental initiatives established from the 1980s onwards that were launched or run by China.<\/p>\n

These initiatives are either created by China or co-created with other governments, or have operations that are mainly managed by Chinese institutions.<\/p>\n

They range from research cooperation and south-south climate funding to high-level policy signalling, such as joint statements on climate change.<\/p>\n

In an interview with Carbon Brief, Yixian discusses the key findings of the new \u201cChina\u2019s Global Environmental Leadership\u201d (CGEL) database.<\/p>\n

He adds that it is not yet clear if the US\u00a0withdrawal<\/a>\u00a0from the UN climate regime will change China\u2019s role in global climate governance.<\/p>\n

The conversation covers how the number of China-led initiatives has changed over time, what these projects look like and how China\u2019s approach to climate \u201cleadership\u201d is changing.<\/p>\n

The interview has been edited for length and clarity. Skip to:<\/strong><\/p>\n

Yixian on the types of climate initiatives:<\/a>\u00a0<\/strong>\u201cThere are all different kinds of initiatives \u2013 we have these typologies of governance functions, including sharing information and building platforms, or developing capacity \u2013 capacity building activities, which can be training delivered by China to other countries. Or also by providing funding, for example.\u201d<\/p>\n

On the rise in new climate initiatives:<\/a>\u00a0<\/strong>\u201cFrom after 2009 and 2010, we\u2019ve seen many initiatives \u2013 of course, more and more over the last 10 years, and even the last five years, from 2021\u2026have been created.\u201d<\/p>\n

On the impact of the Trump administration:<\/a>\u00a0<\/strong>\u201cThe shift of the US under the second Trump administration will probably help Chinese initiatives get more traction from their international partners\u2026Whether or not this will translate into new initiatives or strengthen existing initiatives, I think that\u2019s an open question.\u201d<\/p>\n

On a growing focus on multilateral programmes:<\/a>\u00a0<\/strong>\u201cWhat we have seen is a very clear upward trend of transnational initiatives with a global scope. That means they operate in more than two continents. So, in that sense, what we can see is, actually, China is moving from this bilateral engagement model to more kind of global engagement and trying to project its influence at the global scale.\u201d<\/p>\n

On a climate leadership \u2018mindset\u2019:<\/a>\u00a0<\/strong>\u201c[Leading Chinese experts] said the government, and also people in China, are not ready to become a global leader. But, at the same time\u2026in climate governance, but also in clean-energy supply chains \u2013 China is playing a leading role. So, I think the question is whether this\u2026will translate into the understanding, or mindsets, of people, including policymakers or decision-makers in the country.\u201d<\/p>\n

On the future of China\u2019s climate engagement:<\/a>\u00a0<\/strong>\u201cMy read is that China is willing to share more knowledge, and technology as well, through its international global engagements\u2026But, at the same time, I think, it is not a given. It depends on how countries can make arrangements with China, how they can also propose viable solutions in terms of absorbing Chinese technologies.\u201d<\/p>\n

On the future of multilateral climate negotiations:<\/a> \"<\/strong>Multilateralism is a very important principle, championed in almost all the initiatives. That means China is not going to abandon multilateral processes. Also, we have done some work looking at the alignment of Chinese climate initiatives with existing UN institutions and frameworks, and we also see very close alignment.\"<\/p>\n

Full interview<\/h2>\n

Carbon Brief: Thank you for joining us, Yixian. Your team has compiled a\u00a0<\/strong>database<\/strong><\/a>\u00a0of China\u2019s \u201cenvironmental leadership\u201d. What do you mean by leadership and what did you find in relation to climate change?<\/strong><\/p>\n

Yixian Sun: Thanks Anika, it\u2019s great to speak to Carbon Brief. Leadership is a very contested concept in social science, or especially in international relations. This is why we were very cautious when we thought about the name of this dataset, but we thought it was a good way to capture what we\u2019re trying to do.<\/p>\n

In this project, what we are trying to look at is China\u2019s\u00a0role<\/a>\u00a0in global environmental governance \u2013 China\u2019s shifting role, especially from a more passive participant in global governance processes to play a more proactive role in developing or managing its own initiatives on transnational or cross-border environmental governance.<\/p>\n

So, [this includes] different environmental issues, but, of course, we found that climate change is a very important issue area. By leading, we are using the concept of governance \u2013 in a sense that we are looking at the initiatives where Chinese actors claim some authority over other audiences towards certain public goods. So, it\u2019s trying to provide public goods, in different ways. We have come up with a typology of different governance functions, trying to look at what specific activities Chinese actors are doing, or what kind of public goods Chinese actors are delivering, to the audiences of different initiatives.<\/p>\n

And by audience we mean\u2026international actors. So, that means we are not interested in what China is doing domestically, but beyond its borders.<\/p>\n

CB: Could you explain what some of these climate initiatives look like in practice?<\/strong><\/p>\n

YS: This is very important, because it sounds very abstract if we just talk about leadership. In practical terms, there are all different kinds of initiatives \u2013 we have these typologies of governance functions, including sharing information and building platforms, or developing capacity \u2013 capacity building activities, which can be training delivered by China to other countries.<\/p>\n

Or also by providing funding, for example, China has created this\u00a0south-south climate fund<\/a>. It can also include research collaboration or producing knowledge \u2013 mainly between research institutes.<\/p>\n

It can be traditional leadership activities, in the sense of developing certain international regulatory frameworks or rules or standards \u2013 we call this rulemaking and standard-setting. It can also be pilot projects. China sometimes can start to work directly with some international partners to trial new ideas and new practices \u2013 what we call direct actions.<\/p>\n

These are the different types of leadership activities that we look at and we actually code each initiative that meets the criteria of our database according to this topology, to try to look at what [the Chinese government] are looking at.<\/p>\n

Some initiatives can do multiple things at the same time\u2026One example is the\u00a0Global Energy Interconnection Development and Cooperation Organization<\/a>\u00a0[GEIDCO]. [This was] initially created by the\u00a0State Grid of China<\/a>\u00a0to try to promote clean energy and energy interconnections.<\/p>\n

This initiative will deliver different types of activities, including building the capacity of some developing countries on energy and electricity grids, and also, for example, developing an international platform \u2013 they have annual international meeting and a lot of information-sharing activities, and engagement at UN meetings, including at\u00a0COP side-events<\/a>, and also directly engaging with some international organisations.<\/p>\n

So, this is an example of the type of leadership initiative that has been included in our database.<\/p>\n

CB: And would you say that there\u2019s one particular type of activity that dominates, in terms of China\u2019s climate leadership? Or is it very evenly split against all of the different types?\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n

YS: This is also one of the main findings in our work. In the first paper<\/a>\u00a0we published to highlight the key patterns from the dataset, we highlighted that there\u2019s a very uneven distribution in terms of what China tries to deliver or to promote, itself, internationally on environmental governance.<\/p>\n

There have been a lot of initiatives focusing on sharing information and building platforms and this is the most dominant category \u2013 across all environmental issues, but the same pattern applies to climate change.<\/p>\n

In the\u00a0first article<\/a>\u00a0we published in the Earth Systems Governance journal, we looked at the whole dataset, but we are also developing a few studies, currently under review. One paper particularly looks at climate initiatives and it\u2019s the same pattern: information-sharing and networking.<\/p>\n

At the same time, the least frequent or popular type is the provision of funding \u2013 creating some financing programmes to directly give funding to international partners. I think this reflects China\u2019s position on environmental or climate finance, especially internationally.<\/p>\n

\"Chart
The number of different types of China-led climate initiatives established from 1991-2004. Source: CGEL database.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

[China\u2019s] not trying just to provide money, but really think about how to support other countries on more practical, more pragmatic terms. This is why I think that after information-sharing, what we have seen is capacity-building activities, which have also been quite frequently used by Chinese initiatives when collaborating with their international partners. This also explains China\u2019s logic to teach [others] how to develop things, but not just giving money.<\/p>\n

The other important category is research collaboration and knowledge production. This has been mainly led by research institutes in China, such as the\u00a0Chinese Academy of Sciences<\/a>, especially with a strong focus on scientific co-production.<\/p>\n

But, lately, we have also seen more and more initiatives focused on sharing knowledge not just about science itself, but sometimes also on the social sciences side \u2013 the experiences of China as a whole. China\u2019s experiences can also be learned from by other countries, especially in the global south.<\/p>\n

These are just some examples, but the overall pattern is [a focus on] information-sharing, capacity building and knowledge production and not too much on provision of funding.<\/p>\n

CB: You mentioned the GEIDCO example earlier. How much of a tangible impact would you say a lot of these initiatives have? Are they very high-level, strategic and quite abstract? Or do they kind of result in programmes on the ground?\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n

YS: That\u2019s a very interesting question \u2013 the answer is that it really varies. GEIDCO, as you\u00a0 mentioned, is a very high-level initiative. I think, initially, the idea of energy interconnection was proposed by President Xi himself. Now, of course, GEIDCO, with the backing of the State Grid, does a lot of high-level [national planning] and trans-national [grid network] planning work with developing countries.<\/p>\n

But, at the same time, there are also a lot of grounded, locally focused initiatives. A lot, for example, are co-developed between China \u2013 especially supported by the\u00a0Ministry of Ecology and Environment<\/a>\u00a0[MEE] \u2013 and\u00a0UNEP<\/a>\u00a0[United Nations Environment Programme] in, for example, Africa and Southeast Asia. [This includes] some projects looking at climate adaptation and resilience. But these are more small-scale projects.<\/p>\n

So, in our database \u2013 and I welcome your readers to explore the database itself that you can see \u2013 there are a big variety of initiatives and their scope, their mission and their intended outcomes or impacts vary significantly.<\/p>\n

But we are just providing this public resource. Hopefully, people can use it to further explore, for example, the question of the impact or outcome. At this stage, we\u2019re not going to assess what has been delivered, but I think if we can take, for example, a case-study approach \u2013 trying to trace what has been done, what has been delivered \u2013 this could also be a very interesting research agenda.<\/p>\n

CB: Is there a particular time from when China\u2019s interest in engaging on climate change started, or has this been a very long-term process?<\/strong><\/p>\n

YS: In our database, we really wanted to capture the historical trend. That\u2019s why we looked back from early on \u2013 [we focused on] from the beginning of this century, but also traced initiatives that had been created even earlier but became active in the 21st century.<\/p>\n

So we can [see that,] already in the late 1980s or 90s, there were some initiatives in the area of climate change. But, most importantly, the majority of the initiatives were started after 2008, mainly in the 2010s. We can see a very clear upward trend. It was not shown directly in our\u00a0recently published article<\/a>, but it\u2019s in the database and we have looked at the data and produced a graph for other studies we are currently developing.<\/p>\n

Really, from after 2009 and 2010, we\u2019ve seen many initiatives \u2013 of course, more and more over the last 10 years, and, even the last five years, from 2021, we still see more and more initiatives have been created.<\/p>\n

\"Chart
The number of new China-led international environmental initiatives focused on climate change established between 1991-2024. Source: CGEL database.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

This timeframe corresponds to China\u2019s\u00a0shifting<\/a>\u00a0international role, to move from [being] a more regional power, a large developing country, to a global superpower, and trying to project its influence globally.<\/p>\n

That also correlates with, for example, the\u00a0belt and road initiative<\/a>\u00a0and lately the\u00a0global development initiative<\/a>\u00a0\u2013 China is trying to also use climate change in this broader policy framework and trying to promote and support climate action in different parts of the world.<\/p>\n

CB: The database stops at 2024 \u2013 just before the current administration\u00a0<\/strong>withdrew<\/strong><\/a>\u00a0the US from the Paris Agreement. Have you noticed any changes in China\u2019s global climate engagements following this?\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n

YS: I would say the trend is a continuous one, even with the withdrawal of the US from the Paris Agreement and lately<\/a>\u00a0from the UNFCCC. Because, as I mentioned earlier, over the past 10 years, we have seen this upward trend, with more and more new initiatives created by Chinese actors.<\/p>\n

But I think the shift of the US under the second Trump administration will probably help Chinese initiatives get more\u00a0traction<\/a>\u00a0from their international partners \u2013 or countries or actors that haven\u2019t been engaged very closely with China \u2013 to work more closely with China.<\/p>\n

Whether or not this will translate into new initiatives or strengthen existing initiatives, I think that\u2019s an open question.<\/p>\n

We really want to explore [this] further. Something I didn\u2019t mention earlier is we are publishing this data set as version one, we want to keep updating on a regular basis. We hope we\u2019ll have versions two or three out, maybe every two years. We\u2019ll see how things go, but I think this is a very important question.<\/p>\n

CB: Looking at how China is engaging with all of these different countries \u2013 as you mentioned, more and more potentially wanting to work with it following the US\u2019s withdrawal \u2013 do you get the sense that the Chinese government prefers to engage with countries bilaterally, on a one-to-one basis, or are they also engaging at the regional and multilateral levels?<\/strong><\/p>\n

YS: This is a great question. This is also an important finding from our work, because the conventional understanding is that China prefers to engage with countries bilaterally.<\/p>\n

But, if we look at our database, what we can see is that, actually, China has developed more and more transnational initiatives \u2013 meaning that it also involves non-state actors or [works] beyond the traditional multilateral processes and [develops initiatives] with a global scope.<\/p>\n

If we look at the historical trends, initially \u2013 especially up to 2010 \u2013 there were a lot of bilateral initiatives. Most cases in our database are bilateral initiatives.<\/p>\n

But, lately, I think this trend is shifting. Still, I think there are many more bilateral initiatives than multilateral and transnational initiatives.<\/p>\n

How we differentiate leadership activities of Chinese [state] actors across different levels [affects the trend], but, lately, what we have seen is a very clear upward trend of transnational initiatives with a global scope. That means they operate in more than two continents.<\/p>\n

So, in that sense, what we can see is, actually, China is moving from this bilateral engagement model to more kind of global engagement and trying to project its influence at the global scale.<\/p>\n

I think this is also quite interesting, to understand how not only the government, but also lots of Chinese actors \u2013 including, for example, businesses and civil society actors \u2013 are trying to project and their footprint globally.<\/p>\n

And also I think this reflects a shifting global role of China, in general. We can further explore what the implications of this phenomenon are. This is some ongoing research I\u2019m doing \u2013 trying to understand how actors in different parts of the world react or perceive this changing rule of China and how such engagement between China and different countries shape, or reshape, the sustainability transition.<\/p>\n

CB: You mentioned just then that there\u2019s not just the Chinese government, but also civil society, businesses and other non-state actors. What role do you think these non-state organisations play in the country\u2019s overall climate strategy and climate engagement?<\/strong><\/p>\n

YS: Let me start with the caveat that, first of all, as shown in our database, the government, or state actors, still play a very important role \u2013 especially central government agencies, for example, the MEE<\/a>\u00a0[Ministry of Ecology and Environment] or\u00a0NDRC<\/a>\u00a0[National Development and Reform Commission].<\/p>\n

But, at the same time, especially over the last 10 years, what we have seen is that non-state actors have become more active and engaged more, in various ways, in leading climate initiatives beyond China\u2019s borders.<\/p>\n

This means, sometimes, they collaborate with state actors to co-develop certain initiatives. Sometimes, they develop their own initiatives with, of course, some support from the state. One thing we need to bear in mind is, in China, it\u2019s almost impossible to [avoid involving] the state. At least, you have to closely align with the strategy of the government.<\/p>\n

But, at the same time, what we can see is the agency of these actors. They have developed or showed the ambition to develop certain initiatives, including, for example, standards in the\u00a0critical mineral<\/a>\u00a0space, to provide guidelines to companies for their\u00a0overseas activities<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Similarly, some civil society actors, [such as] research institutes, also want to claim their leadership in a global sphere, trying to showcase how they can lead certain activities and show how their expertise or their knowledge can support countries or actors in other parts of the world.<\/p>\n

CB: On the standards-setting point, is that something where it might be led by one Chinese company with multiple partners \u2013 whether it be from one country or from various different countries in a region? Or is it a broad spectrum of Chinese companies coming together saying that we want to work with Chile, Zimbabwe etc, on mining standards? Is it very representative of the industry, or does it tend to be quite piecemeal?\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n

YS: This is an inclusion criteria for the databases. We [only] look at the initiatives that are, to a large extent, institutionalised. It\u2019s not that company\u2019s claim that \u201cwe are doing this\u201d. If we can\u2019t track down any information or find any records then we cannot include things like that in our database.<\/p>\n

That means we only tend to look at initiatives that are well-developed. These are often, for example, developed by national industry associations. They try to convene different companies together and try to collaborate with, or coordinate, different actors along supply chains and also across sectors or industries.<\/p>\n

When they work with different international partners, this is also a question I think we need to further explore, using our data set to try to look at \u2013 sometimes I think it\u2019s not easy for us to do everything! \u2013 but try to look at what kind of partners they select and how they get involved with partners in different countries or different regions.<\/p>\n

But I think this probably requires some other methodologies to look at, or maybe zoom out to specific cases.<\/p>\n

This is similar \u2013 I always want to use this as a comparison \u2013 when we started [seeing] this phenomenon in Europe or in North America, for example, where companies start to take climate actions, we didn\u2019t really pay a lot of attention to how and who they work with, as long as they say: \u201cWe are trying to support global climate action.\u201d<\/p>\n

But, nowadays, when it comes to the question of China, people start to be interested in who they work with. But if we look at the narrative and discourse of these initiatives, they say as well: \u201cWe want to support actions around the world.\u201d<\/p>\n

They don\u2019t always specify [the geographic scope of their standard-setting work], but if we further zoom into where they are working and why they work in specific areas or regions, this is also an interesting question \u2013 I think there is also a question of politics or political economy there. I would encourage researchers to use our dataset to further explore that kind of question.<\/p>\n

CB: Zooming back out \u2013 the theme of the data set is environmental leadership, but \u2013 at least in global climate negotiations \u2013 Chinese officials have\u00a0<\/strong>eschewed<\/strong><\/a>\u00a0being called a climate leader. Your database seems to show an uptick in activity that could be defined as leadership. Would you say that China wants to be seen as a climate leader?<\/strong><\/p>\n

YS: This is a very strong claim, so I probably would not say [so] \u2013 also, it\u2019s very subjective, depending on who you ask this question to and how people perceive it.<\/p>\n

Let me frame me this way \u2013 let\u2019s separate multilateral negotiation processes from what the country or different actors are doing. Of course, for leadership, another way to measure this is to see the performance itself.<\/p>\n

But, in the end, I think we also tried to be very reflective when we developed this work to acknowledge the subjectivity of leadership and the relational nature of leadership. That means that, if you want to be a leader, others need to acknowledge your leadership or recognise this status.<\/p>\n

But this is why I think it comes to an interesting question about what\u2019s the role of China and how different actors perceive China\u2019s role in today\u2019s global climate governance.<\/p>\n

In multilateral negotiation processes, we are entering into the implementation phase for the Paris Agreement. That means it is very difficult to create new agendas at this stage. [Instead the focus is] trying to see if countries can deliver what they have done.<\/p>\n

Of course, I think there is a question of ambition in terms of updating your\u00a0nationally determined contributions<\/a>. So, there is an ambition question \u2013 there is a performance question.<\/p>\n

If we want to see whether China is becoming a leader, we have to look at how fast, for example, China is accelerating its energy transition, trying to reduce \u2013 of course, some data\u00a0shows<\/a>\u00a0China has already peaked its emissions \u2013 but maybe, how fast China can reduce its emissions.<\/p>\n

Then, in terms of international engagement, what our data is trying to show is that China has become more proactive in that space. The question is also if this engagement translates into some progress in different parts of the world \u2013 if China is actually helping. We need more data to do this kind of impact assessment.<\/p>\n

But, at the same time, I think the question of whether the Chinese government wants itself to be seen as a leader \u2013 this is also an interesting question. Depending on who they want to engage with, in different fora or on different platforms, the answer may be different.<\/p>\n

I just want to quote, when I was in China a few months ago, we had some dialogues with leading Chinese experts. They said the government \u2013 and also people in China \u2013 are not ready to become a global leader. But, at the same time, I think, what China is doing or the role of the country \u2013 in climate governance, but also in\u00a0clean-energy supply chains<\/a>\u00a0\u2013 China is playing a leading role.<\/p>\n

So, I think the question is whether this physical change that has already happened will translate into the understanding, or mindsets, of people, including policymakers or decision-makers in the country.<\/p>\n

I think this is a question that China needs to figure out, itself. Then, of course, there will be implications for China\u2019s strategy for engaging with the rest of the world, especially on climate change.<\/p>\n

CB: And what do you think China\u2019s climate engagements will look like in 5-10 years from now?<\/strong><\/p>\n

YS: I think, from an energy-transition perspective \u2013 let me start from there \u2013 China is going to be, at the least, more proactive in promoting energy transition, because it aligns with China\u2019s economic interests<\/a>\u00a0and, to a certain extent, its political interest as well, to support energy transitions around the world.<\/p>\n

The key question is what role China can play in doing that. Of course, there is the question of\u00a0trade<\/a>, of tariffs. There is also the question of investment, intellectual property and technology transfer.<\/p>\n

My read is that China is willing to share more knowledge, and technology as well, through its international global engagements, to support other countries. But, at the same time, I think, it is not a given. It depends on how countries can make arrangements with China, how they can also propose some viable solutions in terms of absorbing Chinese technologies.<\/p>\n

What we have seen is a lot of countries, especially in the\u00a0global south<\/a>, have benefited already, or are in the process of benefiting from, affordable technologies produced by China.<\/p>\n

But, at the same time, this is not sustainable \u2013 at least from an economic point of view \u2013 not a sustainable situation in the sense that these countries also need to find a way to move themselves upward in supply chains and try to absorb some technologies. How they can work with China [to achieve this] \u2013 that\u2019s a very important question to me and also my team. We want to do more research in that area.<\/p>\n

This is from the energy-transition perspective. But then, if we look at multilateral processes, I would say China is very committed to multilateralism. If we look at all the discourse, including the cases in our database \u2013 we have done some text analysis looking at the narrative discourse of the vision of these initiatives. Multilateralism is a very important principle, championed in almost all the initiatives. That means China is not going to abandon multilateral processes.<\/p>\n

Also, we have done some work looking at the alignment of Chinese climate initiatives with existing UN institutions and frameworks, and we also see very close alignment.<\/p>\n

So, I think this pattern will probably last. At the same time, because \u2013 depending on the other important countries\u2019 climate policies, for example, the US \u2013 back to your question about the leadership in multilateral processes, how proactive and how ambitious China wants to be in taking on this leadership position in multilateral processes is still an open question.<\/p>\n

This also depends on the concept of leadership in different cultures.<\/p>\n

Whether China wants to take over the US to become the only superpower of a global system \u2013 I think this is probably very unlikely. China may want to figure out a slightly different model. Even if, physically, it\u2019s one of the most, or the most, important or powerful countries in the world, how using how the country can use this position to support or guide the governance of global challenges, this is probably slightly different from the views or understanding of, for example, European and other global north countries.<\/p>\n

The question is how China can propose a slightly different model \u2013 still in the current multilateral system \u2013 for governing global challenges, including climate change. This is really important. I don\u2019t have an answer, so that\u2019s why we will continue to look at this question and try to use our research to help people understand what role China can play in global climate governance.<\/p>\n

CB: Thank you.<\/strong><\/p>\n

This interview was conducted by Anika Patel via Zoom on 1 July 2026.<\/p>\n

This policy insight was originally published by\u00a0Carbon Brief<\/a> on 9th July 2026. It is republished under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article here<\/a>.<\/em><\/p>\n

All articles posted on this blog give the views of the author(s), and not the position of the IPR, nor of the University of Bath.<\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Professor Yixian Sun, a sustainability governance expert at the University of Bath, explains what his new database of China-led climate initiatives reveals about the country's evolving international role and whether this amounts to climate leadership. The number of global climate...<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2050,"featured_media":2981,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_access":"","_jetpack_dont_email_post_to_subs":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_tier_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paywalled_content":false,"_jetpack_feature_clip_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":"","jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false},"categories":[114,133,145],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-2979","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-energy-and-environmental-policy","category-global-politics","category-sustainability"],"acf":[],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"https:\/\/blogs.bath.ac.uk\/iprblog\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/115\/2026\/08\/Interview-Dr-Sun-Yixian-on-his-new-database-tracking-Chinese-climate-\u2018leadership-1-scaled.png","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.bath.ac.uk\/iprblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2979","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.bath.ac.uk\/iprblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.bath.ac.uk\/iprblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.bath.ac.uk\/iprblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2050"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.bath.ac.uk\/iprblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=2979"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.bath.ac.uk\/iprblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2979\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.bath.ac.uk\/iprblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/2981"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.bath.ac.uk\/iprblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=2979"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.bath.ac.uk\/iprblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=2979"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.bath.ac.uk\/iprblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=2979"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}