Inter-Imperial Violence: The Politics of Military Recruitment in Russia's Invasion of Ukraine

“It tears me to pieces to see Buryats dying in the war. It hurts to think that we will go down in history as the ones on the front lines against the Ukrainians.” Maria, herself of Buryat descent — one of the largest indigenous communities in Siberia — told me this while grasping to find words to express her feelings. This was in the early summer of 2022. By then, Russian troops had been ravaging Ukraine for months, reducing cities like Kharkiv to rubble and ash.

To understand what is happening, Ukraine must first be situated into the context of inter-imperiality [2]; this term refers to the tapestry of interconnected and competing empires that have sought dominion over this territory. People in Ukraine have borne witness to relentless subjugation for centuries: from the Polish colonization in the 16th century, to its absorption into the Russian Empire in the 18th century, to further scarring in the Soviet era by Stalin’s draconian policies and the harrowing Holodomor. During World War II, Ukraine transformed into a battleground for the clashing ambitions of Nazi and Soviet imperial forces. Today’s war in Ukraine must also be understood as a colonial war, because of Putin’s recent actions to treat Ukraine as a territory to be re-conquered and controlled [3]. Russia’s aggression therefore mirrors both facts: that Russia is not and never has been a decolonial ally [4] and that —  in times of war — interlocking systems of oppression [5] ultimately turn inter-imperial legacies into politics that decide who gets to die and who gets to live.

Reflecting on the tragic reality in Maria’s words, we see echoes of Frantz Fanon’s observations:

“In colonized countries, colonialism, after having made use of the natives on the battlefields, uses them as trained soldiers to put down the movements of independence.”

This insight sheds light on a painful pattern — a repetition of violence seen in the inter-imperial history of Russia [6]. Throughout centuries of expansion, indigenous people across the region who were subjugated and exploited under various empires, including the Ottoman Empire, the Russian Empire, and later Soviets settler colonialism [7], have had to serve the interests of the central authorities and the upper classes. Today, this legacy continues, as subalternized and indigenous people such as the Buryats are disproportionately sent to the front lines in the invasion of Ukraine [8, 9].

The “Un/dispensable”

To bolster its ranks, the Russian military has used a variety of methods to recruit soldiers within and beyond its borders.

In regions such as Buryatia (bordering Mongolia) and Sakha (northern Siberia), indigenous people who were subalternized by colonizing policies before, during, and after the Soviet Union face precarious lives and infrastructural neglect. Here, the government has exploited economic desperation to recruit soldiers, taking advantage of the socio-economic hardships of ethnicized and racialized communities. Similarly, the North Caucasus regions of Chechnya, Ingushetia, and Dagestan — home to dozens of diverse groups in terms of descent and belief, such as the Avars and Kumyks — have also seen significant recruitment activity. Men from these regions are often pressured to join the military with minimal training, making them cannon fodder in the war. In some cases, it is poverty, desperation, and hopelessness that drive people into military service; in others, it is threats of violence, torture, and extortion of the welfare of their entire families. In some regions, such as Dagestan, however, recruitment efforts have been met with significant resistance and protests [10], underscoring deep-seated socio-political conflicts, the population’s dissatisfaction with the central government’s policies, and opposition to the war in Ukraine.

Marginalized workers from religious minorities have also been explicitly targeted for recruitment. In some areas, military recruiters have positioned themselves outside mosques and informal prayer houses, capitalizing on worshippers’ gatherings to issue summonses or conscript. Coercion tactics include threats like “you conscript or to go to jail” and are coupled with intimidation measures such as family deportation. This strategy is particularly prevalent in Moscow and other large cities with high concentrations of migrant workers from former Soviet Central Asia [11]. The nationwide “Illegal 2023” operation exemplifies this brutal strategy. Police have conducted extensive raids on construction sites, markets, farms, restaurants, and apartment buildings, and have engaged in racial profiling on streets and in subways by targeting those who do not look “Slavic” or “Russian” [12]. This operation has been criticized for targeting labor migrants who look Muslim by rights groups and media reports. Although these marginalized workers have long faced hate attacks, arbitrary arrests, police brutality, extortion, and threats, the Russian state’s construction of the “Church for Islam” and muftis associated with this discourse [13] had provided the regime with crucial “Islamic” legitimacy. Following the invasion of Ukraine, these muftis issued a fatwa declaring that Muslims from Russia who fight and fall on the Russian side will achieve martyrdom and enter paradise [14]. This religious endorsement aimed to mitigate resistance and encourage enlistment among the Muslim population, combining religious motivations with economic incentives to bolster Russia’s military ranks. Possibly, the underlying premise of becoming a stronger part of the nation carried the promise of being less Othered and suggested a (false) promise of inclusion. There have also been reports of people being intercepted directly in front of synagogues. The extent of these targeted attacks remains unclear at this time.

Russia’s military recruitment strategy extends well beyond its borders and beyond any ethics. In addition to forced recruitment in the interior of the country, people are also recruited abroad under false pretenses. There is evidence that workers from Uzbekistan, who signed contracts for construction work in the Russian-occupied city of Mariupol in southern Ukraine, ended up on the front lines [15]. This is not an isolated incident; in India [16], rural workers and the so-called unemployed have been deceived into joining the Russian military via Belarus under false pretenses of high-paying jobs. Some individuals reported that they were signing up for jobs in places like Dubai, only to find themselves on the front lines in Ukraine. This deceptive and dehumanizing practice has led to international outcry and demands for the return of these recruits. A further tactic preys on peoples’ desires for economic stability and legal status: Citizens of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan [17] have been lured with lucrative signing bonuses and the promise of fast-track citizenship in exchange for military service. This reflects a broader strategy of recruiting marginalized individuals in the post-Soviet regions and beyond. Following this logic, Russia has recruited mercenaries from Syria and Libya, offering them monthly payments ranging from $300 to $600. These efforts are facilitated through fourteen recruitment centers located in regions under Bashar al-Assad’s control, such as Damascus and Aleppo. This strategy leverages historical ties from Russia’s involvement in the Syrian civil war [18]. Russia has also recruited in Nepal [19] and Cuba [20], where promises of citizenship entice people seeking better livelihoods. Most recently, mercenaries from Sri Lanka [21] and various African countries, including Rwanda, Burundi, Congo, Somalia, and Uganda have been recruited [22]. According to Ukrainian intelligence and media reports, they are offered initial payments of $2,000 to sign a contract, and then a monthly allowance of $2,200, health insurance, and the prospect of Russian citizenship for themselves and their families [23]. These recruitment efforts underscore Russia’s strategy of recruiting soldiers in peripheral regions; in this way, Russia bolsters its military ranks while minimizing the impact on its own population — especially the middle classes, as the upper classes were not involved in this war anyway.

The global dimension of inter-imperial violence and resistance to it

Inter-imperiality produces not only interlocking systems of violence but also resistance [24, 25]. Activists and organizations within and outside of Russia, such as the Free Buryatia Foundation, have highlighted the unequal burden placed on their communities and have protested the war in Ukraine from the beginning. And some individuals from Buryatia and Yakutia have joined the Siberian Battalion to defend Ukraine [26]. The motivation behind this commitment is rooted in a deep desire for autonomy and a rejection of the oppressive conditions that have been around for generations. People fighting in this battalion have expressed that their participation is a step towards not only resisting Russian aggression in Ukraine but also forging a future in which their people and homelands can also enjoy freedom.

Another form of protest is to evade recruitment by hiding within the country or fleeing abroad. While a global solidarity network [27] exists that supports these efforts, it is predominantly composed of the diaspora, rather than a broader international community. The violence described above — which determines who is sent to war, whose lives are deemed disposable, and whose communities must repeatedly endure episodes of intergenerational trauma — continues when conscientious objectors seek refuge in other countries. Those who flee to the European Union, for example, experience a reproduction of systemic violence. It is true that parts of the middle classes can find jobs or study programs abroad, leaving the war partially behind and relying on their networks of economic, cultural, or social capital to take them to safer places. For many others, and especially for the most marginalized within Russia, however, the path to a safer place is difficult or nearly impossible. Their political stance as conscientious objectors, draft evaders, or deserters is not considered a valid reason for asylum. This means that only a handful, those with luck, unbelievable persistence, or the right connections, are able to find shelter.

The interconnectedness of Russian war politics with the asylum policies of other countries is a relevant factor in this systemic violence. The European Union and other governments fail to protect those in need therefore exacerbating the precarious conditions of these oppositional and vulnerable individuals. Thus, the cycle of marginalization continues, furthering a historical legacy of dehumanization and trauma as the poorest and most marginalized are left behind — trapped by both the violence of the Russian state and the indifference of the international community. The lack of attention from the latter reflects a deficit in asylum law, which does not acknowledge these realities, as well as the lack of a large anti-war movement. Despite the objective necessity for this, the world has instead witnessed an escalating global arms race with no end in sight, seemingly ushering in a new and unprecedented spiral of global militarization.

Given all of this, there has been a glaring absence of willingness to deal with the necropolitics involved in this war. Necropolitics [28], as described by Achille Mbembe, is a concept that reveals the inherent violence in modern democracies. Mbembe argues that sovereign powers maintain control by deciding who can live and who must die, often creating heavily policed, violent spaces both within and outside their borders. This includes colonies, refugee camps, and other areas where laws are suspended and people are subject to extreme conditions. Mbembe challenges the notion that democracies are purely peaceful, highlighting how they rely on the exploitation, surveillance, and control of marginalized groups to sustain themselves. Asylum policies that do not recognize the simple fact that people do not want to die and to kill form a part of such necropolitics and the wider inter-imperial violence relating to the war in Ukraine.

The need to break with the zeitgeist of militarization has become increasingly urgent. This entails serious engagement with the concept of mass desertion [29], adopting international measures, and supporting and further developing solidarity networks capable of countering an increasingly necropolitical approach to governance. Progressive forces must seriously engage and learn from anticolonial and queer-feminist anti-war movements and focus on anti-authoritarian ethics and politics that prioritize life over death. This includes offering refuge and support to deserters and conscientious objectors and their communities, who should not be left behind.

[1] For the original source, see Latypova, L. (2024, March 1). Not Russians’ ‘little brother’ anymore. Russia’s decolonial movement banks on interethnic solidarity in its fight against the Kremlin. Meduza. https://meduza.io/en/feature/2024/03/01/not-russians-little-brother-anymore

[2] Doyle, L. (2013). Inter-Imperiality: Dialectics in a Postcolonial World History. Interventions, 16(2), 159–196. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369801X.2013.776244

[3] Snyder, T. (2022). The War in Ukraine Is a Colonial War. The New Yorker (April 28, 2022). https://www.newyorker.com/news/essay/the-war-in-ukraine-is-a-colonial-war

[4] Durdiyeva, S. (2023). ‘Not in Our Name:’ Why Russia is Not a Decolonial Ally or the Dark Side of Civilizational Communism and Imperialism. The SAIS Review of International Affairs (May 29, 2023). https://saisreview.sais.jhu.edu/not-in-our-name-why-russia-is-not-a-decolonial-ally-or-the-dark-side-of-civilizational-communism-and-imperialism/

[5] Combahee River Collective Statement (1977). (2009). In Oxford University Press eBooks. https://doi.org/10.1093/acref/9780195301731.013.78642

[6] See, for example, the history of the Urkun in 1961, an uprising against the Tsarist colonialism of the indigenous inhabitants of Russian Turkestan. The revolt in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan was sparked by the conscription of Muslims into the Russian military for service on the Eastern Front during World War I. See for example Chokobaeva, A., Drieu, C., & Morrison, A. (2020). The Central Asian Revolt of 1916: A collapsing empire in the age of war and revolution. Manchester University Press.

[7] Kassymbekova, B., & Chokobaeva, A. (2023, May 7). Expropriation, Assimilation, Elimination: Understanding Soviet Settler Colonialism. Retrieved July 22, 2024, from https://www.southsouthmovement.org/dialogues/expropriation-assimilation-elimination-understanding-soviet-settler-colonialism/

[8] Vyushkova, M., & Sherkhonov, E. (2023). Russia’s ethnic minority Casualties of the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Inner Asia, 25(1), 126–136. https://doi.org/10.1163/22105018-02501011

[9] Latypova, L. (2024, July 22). 2 years into Ukraine war, Russia’s ethnic minorities disproportionately killed in battle. The Moscow Times. https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2024/02/24/2-years-into-ukraine-war-russias-ethnic-minorities-disproportionately-killed-in-battle-a84170

[10] Faulconbridge, G., Kerry, F. & Wallis, D. (2022, September 25). Scores detained after police clash with people opposed to mobilisation in Russia's Dagestan. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/police-clash-with-people-opposed-mobilisation-russias-dagestan-2022-09-25/

[11] Novaya Gazeta Europe (2023, November 18). В Балашихе силовики провели рейд в мечети (in Balashikha law enforcers raided a mosque). https://novayagazeta.eu/articles/2023/11/18/v-balashikhe-siloviki-proveli-reid-v-mecheti-nekotorykh-muzhchin-zaderzhivali-pod-predlogom-posetit-voenkomat-news

[12] Mirovalev, M. (2023, November 1). Is Russia recruiting Muslim migrants to fight its war in Ukraine? Al Jazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/11/1/is-russia-recruiting-muslim-migrants-to-fight-its-war-in-ukraine

[13] Sibgatullina, G. (2023). The Muftis and the Myths: Constructing the Russian “Church for Islam.” Problems of Post-Communism, 1–12. https://doi.org/10.1080/10758216.2023.2185899

[14] Kemper, M. (2022). Ijtihād in Putin’s Russia? Signature Fatwas from Moscow and Kazan. Journal of the economic and social history of the Orient, 65(7), 935–960. https://doi.org/10.1163/15685209-12341585

[15] Baranovskaya, M. (2023, September 13). How Russia drafts migrants to fight in Ukraine. dw.com. https://www.dw.com/en/how-russia-drafts-migrants-to-fight-in-ukraine/a-66792405

[16] Dayal, S. (2024, March 24). Indians killed in Ukraine were forced to fight for Russia, families say. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/india/indians-killed-ukraine-were-forced-fight-russia-families-say-2024-03-07/

[17] Lebedev, F (2023, August 3). Russia targets neighbour Kazakhstan with army recruitment ads. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-targets-neighbour-kazakhstan-with-army-recruitment-ads-2023-08-03/

[18] Rusinkevich, T. (2022, August 23). Платять по 600 доларів: Росія вербує найманців у Сирії та Лівії (they pay 600 dollars each: Russia recruits mercenaries in Syria and Libya). 24 Канал. https://24tv.ua/platyat-po-600-dolariv-rosiya-verbuye-naymantsiv-siriyi-liviyi_n1904114

[19] Sharma, G. (2023, December 6). Nepal police detain 10 over allegations they sent youths to Russian army. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/nepal-police-detain-10-over-allegations-they-sent-youths-russian-army-2023-12-06/

[20] Sherwood, D. & Frank, M. (2023, September 5) Cuba uncovers human trafficking of Cubans to fight for Russia in Ukraine. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/cuba-uncovers-human-trafficking-cubans-fight-russia-ukraine-2023-09-05/

[21] Jayasinghe, U. (2024, May 24). Sri Lanka tightens controls to stop men being duped into Ukraine fighting. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/sri-lanka-tightens-controls-stop-men-being-duped-into-ukraine-fighting-2024-05-30/

[22] Hunder, M. & Malenko. (2024, May 24). Ukraine urges poor nations to protect citizens from Russian recruitment. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-urges-poor-nations-protect-citizens-russian-recruitment-2024-03-15/

[23] Росія активно вербує найманців у 4 країнах Африки (Russia is actively recruiting mercenaries in 4 African countries). (2024, May 28). Мілітарний. https://mil.in.ua/uk/news/rosiya-aktyvno-verbuye-najmantsiv-u-4-krayinah-afryky/.

[24] A study of anti-war initiatives in Russia: How Russians are resisting their state’s war in Ukraine and dealing with its repercussions, 2022, https://ru-antiwar.civilmplus.org (for the whole report see: https://civilmplus.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/Russian-anti-war-activism_en.pdf)

[25] Yegorov-Crate, K. T. (2023, September 15). Indigenous Anti-War Initiatives in Russia are Inherently Anti-Colonialist. Cultural Survival. https://www.culturalsurvival.org/publications/cultural-survival-quarterly/indigenous-anti-war-initiatives-russia-are-inherently-anti

[26] Hunder, M. (2023, October 24). Ukraine’s Siberian Battalion recruits Russians to help fight Moscow. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraines-siberian-battalion-recruits-russians-help-fight-moscow-2023-10-24/

[27] Among others, see Idite Lesom (https://iditelesom.org/en), Movement of Conscientious Objectors Russia (https://stoparmy.org), Our House (https://news.house), In Transit (see https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/14/world/europe/russia-antiwar-dissidents-escape.html), International Network for Conscientious Objection and Desertion (https://de.connection-ev.org).

[28] Mbembe, A. (2019). Necropolitics. Duke University Press.

[29] Hardt, M., & Mezzadra, S. (2024, May 9). A global war regime. Sidecar. https://newleftreview.org/sidecar/posts/a-global-war-regime