Dr Aurelien Mondon is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Politics, Languages and International Studies at the University of Bath. Dr Aaron Winter is a Senior Lecturer in Criminology and Criminal Justice at the University of East London.
In October 2016, as the US election loomed, Farage (2016) wrote in an opinion piece in The Telegraph, a symbol of his media prominence:
“The similarities between the different sides in this election are very like our own recent battle. As the rich get richer and big companies dominate the global economy, voters all across the West are being left behind. The blue-collar workers in the valleys of South Wales angry with Chinese steel dumping voted Brexit in their droves. In the American rust belt, traditional manufacturing industries have declined, and it is to these people that Trump speaks very effectively….”
This kind of statement was not limited to far-right politicians claiming political support from the working class, but has become common in much of the political commentary since.
While much of the west has witnessed a resurgence of the far right since the end of the 2000s, 2016 marked a new step in the mainstreaming of reactionary and particularly racist, Islamophobic and xenophobic political movements, agendas and discourses (Mondon and Winter 2017). Amongst others, the Brexit victory in the United Kingdom and Donald Trump’s election to the Presidency in the United States have demonstrated that these movements, agendas and discourses can now win key electoral battles. While much has already been written on these two cases and events, the aim of our article recently published in Identities is to focus the discussion on the construction of the white working class to promote racist agendas, adding to a limited, but growing analysis (Bhambra 2017, Emejulu 2016, Lentin 2017, Mondon 2017, Nadeem et al. 2017, Saini 2017, Virdee and McGeever 2017, Winter 2017).
Our contribution is three-fold: first, to interrogate the construction of these votes, specifically as white working class revolts; second, to demonstrate that the prevalent mainstream explanations about the rise of a (white) working class reaction is based on an ideological racialised construction of the working class, and skewed reading of data in both cases that do not sustain even basic scrutiny; third, that such explanations and skewered data reproduce, and even support, a particular discourse and political agenda, legitimising Trump and Brexit, as well as racism and xenophobia, and delegitimising the working class - whether consciously or not.
To achieve so, our article examines this mainstreaming of racism, focusing on the transformation of the discourses and rhetoric about race and class. Particular attention is paid to the populist racialisation of the working class as white and indigenous in the Brexit and Trump campaigns, as well as media commentaries and academic analysis which promotes and legitimises it. In doing so, our aim is not to explain the reasons behind the vote for Trump or Brexit, but rather to examine such explanations and how these reproduce or even support a particular discourse and political agenda.
To challenge the narrative constructing Brexit and Trump as working-class revolts, we use a two-pronged approach. First, we show how the working class has always been diverse, but subject to processes that integrate different ethnicities into whiteness and the racialisation of the working class as white, concealing its diversity and allowing for an essentialist narrative based on white (and often male) experience. This leads us to argue that, while racism is indeed present in the working class, its diverse nature should not be ignored and the racism present in upper classes should not be downplayed, particularly when the so-called revolt depends on the construction of whiteness and is led by the privileged (both in terms of race and wealth). Second, we then take a more electoral approach and demonstrate that the working-class revolts for both Trump and Brexit are in fact far less obvious than the coverage of both electoral contests would suggest. In fact, the working-class nature of these two votes is marginal and can be challenged, but is mostly ignored in elite discourse, as demonstrated in the article.
We argue the white working class narrative as problematic in four ways. The first is that it racialises the working class as white and pits an elusive ‘white working class’ against racialised minorities and immigrants, who are denied working class status, in a competition for scarce, deregulated and casualised employment, and ever dwindling resources in neo-liberal Britain and America. Second, it constructs the ‘white working class’ as privileging their racial interests above class ones and as being racist, which results in the very stigma right-wing populist and libertarian advocates, who are themselves often part of the elites, falsely and opportunistically claim to oppose. Third, it normalises and mainstreams racism in both discourse and practice by portraying it as a popular demand, thus potentially fuelling hate crime. Finally, in addition to not addressing the inequality faced by ‘white’ working class people, it exacerbates the inequality and vulnerability faced by racialised and migrant working class peoples and actually serves establishment political and economic interests.
The white working class revolt narrative mobilised by the populist far right and hyped by elite discourse has ignored not only elite driven racism (e.g. in politics, academia and the media), but also the more structural, institutional and systemic operation of racism in our societies. While those in positions of power (whether political or discursive) have often argued that they are merely responding to what ‘the people’ want, they have carefully ignored or downplayed the role they play as gate-keepers and shapers of public discourse and their proven influence as agenda-setters. Therefore, rather than ‘the people’ suddenly reverting to racist attitudes, we argue that it is the widespread and widely publicised acceptance, based on skewed evidence, that ‘the people’ has turned racist, that perversely led to the legitimisation of a racism as it began to be discussed as a popular feeling, rather than a construction fuelled by elite discourse.
This blog is an extract from Whiteness, populism and the racialisation of the working class in the United Kingdom (Aurelien Mondon and Aaron Winter, 2018).
References
Bhambra, G. 2017. “Brexit, Trump, and ‘Methodological Whiteness’: On the Misrecognition of Race and Class.” British Journal of Sociology: Special Issue on the Trump/Brexit Moment: Causes and Consequences 68 (S1): S214–S232.
Emejulu, A. 2016. “On the Hideous Whiteness of Brexit: “Let Us Be Honest about Our past and Our Present if We Truly Seek to Dismantle White Supremacy”.” Verso
Mondon, A. 2017. “Limiting Democratic Horizons to a Nationalist Reaction: Populism, the Radical Right and the Working Class.” Javnost/The Public: Journal of the European Institute for Communication and Culture 24 (3): 355-374.
Mondon, A., and A. Winter. 2017. “Articulations of Islamophobia: From the Extreme to the Mainstream?” Ethnic and Racial Studies Review 40 (13): 2151-2179.
Nadeem, S., R. B. Horowitz, V. T. Chen, M. W. Hughley, J. Eastman, and K. J. Cramer. 2017. “Viewpoints: Whitewashing the Working Class.” Contexts, June 23.
Virdee, S., and B. McGeever. 2017. “‘Racism, Crisis, Brexit’.” In Ethnic and Racial Studies: Race and Crisis Special Issue, edited by Virdee and Gupta, 1802-1819. 41/10.
Winter, A. 2017. “Brexit and Trump: On Racism, the Far Right and Violence.” Institute for Policy Research (IPR) Blog, April 3.
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